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This is not the first time that Switzerland decided to do a bit of cherry picking. In fact, it 
started to dismantle the existing framework on the movement of persons two years ago 
when it reintroduced quotas for EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe. At that time, 
the EU registered a mild protest. Now that the results of the referendum held on February 9th 
may also affect the West European nationals, the European Union will not, most likely, shy 
away from doing what it should have done a while ago. And that is to ask the Swiss 
authorities a simple question: Are you with us or not? All seven agreements falling under the 
Bilateral I package, which was signed in 1999, are bound by a so-called ‘guillotine clause’. 
They must enter into force altogether or not at all. If one of them is terminated, the others 
will end up in the law history books too. Back in late 1990s, it was a smart move to include 
such a clause as it stopped Switzerland and its voters from choosing truffles over the less-
popular chocolates from the same box. But in 2014, this arrangement may be more 
problematic than it appears to be at the first sight. This Commentary argues that the time has 
come for a serious and comprehensive discussion about the future of EU-Swiss relations. 
A look back into history 
From an historical perspective, this potentially dramatic turn in EU-Swiss relations is 
nothing new. Switzerland has been uneasy about the European integration process from the 
very start of the formation of the European Communities. However, close proximity to those 
involved, particularly after several rounds of EU enlargement, forced it to begin gradual 
integration with the European Union. Some moves were taken on a purely voluntary basis, 
particularly autonomous approximation of Swiss law with EU acquis. Yet, the bilateral 
contractual relationship developed quite incrementally leading to the existing framework 
composed of over 100 EU-Swiss agreements on a wide range of dossiers, starting with cheese 
and watches and ending with free movement of persons. 
The thought of EU membership did cross Swiss minds in 1992 when, as a matter of fact, 
Switzerland applied for it. Furthermore, being an EFTA country, it was fully involved in the 
brainstorming on the European Economic Space, which eventually led to proper negotiations 
of, what is now, an Agreement with the EU on the European Economic Area. As is well 
known, the Swiss voters in a nation-wide referendum rejected the negotiated deal in 1992 
and, consequentially, the carefully planned integration with the internal market unravelled 
completely. Not only did Switzerland fail to join the EEA, it also had to freeze its EU 
membership bid. Suddenly the authorities in Bern found themselves on a collision course 
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with their own citizens and, at the same time, outside of the mainstream integration 
movement. 
Knowing the economic impact of staying outside, with a mere Free Trade Agreement of 1972 
and dozens of other sectoral deals in force, a way forward had to be developed. This led to 
two packages of bilateral treaties, which are currently in force. The choice of dossiers 
reflected interests and preferences of both sides. The Bilateral I package contains agreements 
on movement of persons, air transport, carriage of goods by rail and road, trade in 
agricultural products, mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment, government 
procurement, scientific and technological cooperation. The agreements falling under the 
Bilateral II umbrella touch upon Schengen, asylum, taxation of savings, anti-fraud measures, 
trade in processed agriculture products, statistics as well as participation of Switzerland in 
the European Environmental Agency and in MEDIA programmes. 
As already noted, the Bilateral I package is chained with the guillotine clause. This is 
generally not the case with the Bilateral II, but the Schengen and asylum agreements are 
bound by a specific guillotine clause. Arguably, there is also an invisible guillotine between 
the free movement of persons and Schengen agreements. They are inextricably linked, hence 
the latter cannot function without the former (but not the other way round). Some of those 
agreements lead to very deep legal integration between the European Union and 
Switzerland. As noted elsewhere, they resulted in the creation of the European Union Legal 
Space as Switzerland has an obligation to apply EU acquis mentioned in the annexes to these 
agreements.1 This, as explained below, has proved to be quite problematic and raised 
justified concerns on the part of the European Union. 
Is there a problem? 
There is no doubt that the referendum of February 9th complicates EU-Swiss relations even 
further. It has already led to the suspension of ratification of a tailor-made Protocol to the 
Free Movement of Persons Agreement, allowing the extension of the existing regime to 
Croatian citizens. Some other bilateral negotiations have also been suspended. This does not 
mean to say, however, that the relationship had been trouble free until now. On the contrary: 
problems have been building up for quite some time and the latest development only 
exacerbates the accumulated tensions. From the legal point of view, the Swiss model of 
enhanced bilateralism or ‘box of chocolates’ integration has been flawed from the start. This 
model of integration without EU membership is based on the premise that Switzerland will 
voluntarily comply with the ever-changing EU acquis and, to this end, will guarantee the 
homogeneity of its law book and case law. Alas, the lack of robust enforcement machinery 
has allowed Switzerland to allegedly breach the Free Movement of Persons Agreement as 
well as to undermine the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law. Furthermore, with a few 
exceptions, Switzerland does not have the obligation to follow changes to EU law. This leads 
to a fragmentation of the legal regime, which is a headache for practicing lawyers and policy-
makers. Already in December 2010, the Council of the European Union argued: 
[d]ue to a lack of efficient arrangements for the take-over of new EU acquis including 
ECJ case-law, and for ensuring the supervision and enforcement of the existing 
agreements, this approach does not ensure the necessary homogeneity in the parts of 
the internal market and of the EU policies in which Switzerland participates. This has 
resulted in legal uncertainty for authorities, operators and individual citizens. 
The Council added that the system is not fit for purpose, and therefore: 
                                                   
1 See further, A. Łazowski, “Enhanced multilateralism and enhanced bilateralism: Integration without 
membership in the European Union”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 45, 2008, pp. 1433-1458. 
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horizontal issues related to the dynamic adaptation of agreements to the evolving 
acquis, the homogeneous interpretation of the agreements, an independent 
surveillance and judicial enforcement mechanisms and a dispute settlement 
mechanism need to be reflected in EU­Switzerland agreements.2 
The same issues were also raised in subsequent conclusions of the Council. According to 
2012 Conclusions Switzerland is now, by having re-introduced the quotas for the Central and 
Eastern European states, in breach of the Free Movement of Persons Agreement. Following 
the referendum it is likely to do the same vis-à-vis the remaining member states and this will 
only make matters worse. However, before that happens it might be worth paying attention 
to the title of the existing agreement: it is about free movement of persons. Reintroduction of 
quotas will make the word “free” redundant.  
There is one more systemic problem that merits attention. A very fragmented institutional 
set-up, principally leaving the decision-making in the hands of countless EU-Swiss 
committees, which are based on several bilateral agreements, does not help. So, as already 
argued, the time has come for a serious reconsideration of the bilateral relationship. This 
discussion should go beyond the current discourse about free movement of persons. 
Options ahead 
The guillotine clauses are both a blessing and a curse. To start with, they help to keep the 
reactions to the results of the referendum fairly balanced. Both sides are fully aware that a 
rapid move will make this sensitive situation even worse. The carefully stitched-together 
packages of bilateral treaties can come unravelled with the speed of the Concorde. As for the 
European Union, it has several options at its disposal. In the short term, it simply has to 
address the mere fact that Switzerland is in breach of its obligations and, ultimately, to make 
it clear that it has tools at its disposal to terminate the Bilateral I package. This is not only for 
the sake of clarity in relations with one of its most integrated neighbours but also to send a 
clear signal to Whitehall. If the EU allows Switzerland to get away with a serious breach of a 
cornerstone of bilateral relationship, it will give the UK eurosceptics a false impression that 
the Swiss model allows a third country to breach the bilateral agreements at its will and 
without consequences. This is something the European Union cannot afford when such an 
agreement creates a joined legal space with a neighbouring country. In the medium-term, the 
European Union may use the current situation as an opportunity to revamp quite 
considerably its relations with Switzerland and to create a framework that is far more 
coherent as well as easier to navigate and manage. The Association Agreements, which the 
EU hopefully will conclude with Moldova and Georgia, give an indication where things 
could be heading with Switzerland. Although the aims and scope of a new deal with 
Switzerland would be different, those draft agreements could be a good basis on which to 
start discussions with the Swiss authorities. Another option is to consider a model based on 
the European Economic Area.  
The ball is squarely now in the court of the Swiss authorities and they are already planning 
the next steps. As per the results of the referendum, they have three years in which to impose 
quotas on EU citizens. The EU, however, should have a firm position too – and the sooner, 
the better. László Andor, European Commissioner for employment, social affairs and 
inclusion, has already made it clear in his statement to the European Parliament on February 
26th that the EU’s “marge de manoeuvre […] is extremely limited”. At the same time, the Swiss 
should not suffer under the illusion that the 1999 Agreement on Free Movement of Persons 
may be unravelled easily and without adverse consequences. This puts the Bern authorities 
                                                   
2 Council conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries, 14 December 2010. 
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in a very difficult position as, politically, they cannot escape the obligation to translate the 
outcome of the referendum into law. 
Conclusions 
The results of the referendum will imminently force both sides to explore an existential 
question: Quo vadis? Both the timing and the cards are to the EU’s advantage, as the Swiss 
authorities will struggle with reconciling the existing obligations with the results of the 
referendum. Maybe it is worth thinking about the guillotine clauses. If they are triggered, 
Switzerland and the European Union may be obliged to reflect on whether these multiple 
agreements are worth the candle. Once deprived of the benefits of the internal market, the 
Swiss voters may come to appreciate that it is impossible to eat one’s sweets and have them 
too. This may be a golden opportunity for the European Union to press for a comprehensive 
framework agreement with Switzerland that would simplify the existing regime and provide 
for a uniform institutional set-up.  
What both sides cannot avoid, however, is a frank discussion about free movement of 
persons. That dossier will be crucial for any future steps that will be taken by the EU and the 
Swiss authorities. 
